Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act by Fuller, David W.
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 2011 Article 5
2011
Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the
Federal Tort Claims Act
David W. Fuller
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 375 (2011).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 44 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 44 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-MAY-12 11:23
ARTICLE
INTENTIONAL TORTS AND OTHER
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
DAVID W. FULLER1
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) creates a broad waiver of sover-
eign immunity for tort claims against the United States but also provides for
a number of exceptions. Beyond the much-discussed “discretionary func-
tion” exception found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), additional exceptions—such
as the so-called “intentional tort” exception—are located throughout the
statutory text and vary widely in subject matter and wording. Most of them
appear in a list found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680,2 but other important exceptions
1. Assistant United States Attorney, District of Minnesota. The views expressed in this arti-
cle are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the positions of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.
2. In relevant part, the exceptions under 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006), read as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the [g]overnment,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the [g]overnment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or
postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer. . . .
. . . .
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating
to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the [g]overnment in
administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of [t]itle 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by
the United States.
[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, c. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.]
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights: Provided, [t]hat, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter
and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of
the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investi-
gative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is em-
375
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are found elsewhere in the FTCA or are products of the definitions and
general scope of the statute.3 Still more exceptions have been implied by
the courts4 or arise from other federal statutes.5
As with the discretionary-function exception, applicability of these ex-
ceptions frequently becomes the central issue in a lawsuit brought under the
FTCA. Notwithstanding the FTCA’s general reference to and incorporation
of state law, the interpretation and applicability of any of the statute’s ex-
ceptions are matters of federal law.6 The exceptions are generally jurisdic-
tional and the government may raise them at any point in an FTCA
lawsuit.7
This article provides an overview of these carve-outs to the FTCA’s
establishment of governmental tort liability with an emphasis on the often-
complex interplay between exceptions or between an exception and another
part of the FTCA. The article begins by setting forth a description of the
FTCA and its many exceptions, including consideration of Congress’s ra-
tionales for enacting (and subsequently modifying) some of them. The arti-
cle also reviews ways in which courts have applied certain of the
exceptions—especially the “intentional tort” exception—over the years.
Particular attention is given to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED). IIED was not widely recognized when the FTCA was origi-
nally passed, and some early decisions considered IIED claims to be barred
by the statute’s exclusion of claims for assault and battery. More recently,
courts have recognized that an IIED claim may be brought under the FTCA
so long as it is not really a clever substitute for other claims that would fall
within one of the statutory exceptions—a line that is often quite difficult to
draw.
powered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations
of [f]ederal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the
regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(l) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a [f]ederal land bank, a [f]ederal intermedi-
ate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
Id.
3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006) (defining “employee” and “agency” in a way that
excludes liability on the part of government contractors).
4. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (barring all FTCA claims by
military personnel arising out of activity incident to military service).
5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006) (barring federal employees from suing the United
States for on-the-job injuries).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976); Logue v. United States, 412
U.S. 521, 528 (1973); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 705–06 (1961).
7. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1983).
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I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIM ACT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. The FTCA
Originally passed in 1946, the FTCA exposes the United States to po-
tential civil liability in federal court
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.8
In enacting the FTCA, Congress was principally concerned with addressing
what might be considered “garden variety” negligence torts—the most
prominent example cited at the time being accidents involving government
vehicles.9 By its terms, however, the statute reaches further than garden
variety negligence torts and applies to a broad array of factual situations.10
On the other hand, there are also substantial categories of tort liability—
such as strict liability for ultra-hazardous governmental activity—that the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not reach.11
Whatever one might think of them, the FTCA’s exceptions underscore
the principle that the law does not provide a remedy for every wrong—
particularly where the government is concerned.12 Indeed, Congress never
intended the FTCA as a comprehensive waiver of governmental immunity
from tort liability. While a concern for fairness and equity in favor of ag-
grieved plaintiffs certainly motivated legislators, that concern had to be bal-
anced against others and was not the only impetus behind the FTCA.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
9. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 76-2428, at 5 (1940); Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judici-
ary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong. 66 (1942); see also Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 28 (1953) (noting car accident cases as “uppermost” in Congress’s mind at time of FTCA
passage); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707 n.4 (2004).
10. See Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Action Under the FTCA: A
Synthesis and Proposal, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1991) (noting that the FTCA encompasses a
variety of “complex, attenuated, and unperceived conduct”). This raises the interesting question of
whether the FTCA rightly applies to newly-created torts that may not have existed when this
waiver of sovereign immunity was enacted. See generally Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sex-
ual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299 (1991) (proposing a
new “tort of sexual harassment”); see also infra pp. 390–97 (discussing development of case law
addressing applicability to tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
11. See, e.g., Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972) (rejecting claim for damages to home
in connection with sonic booms; “Liability of this type under the [FTCA] is not to be broadened
beyond the intent of Congress by dressing up the substance of strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities in the garments of common-law trespass.”); see also id. (citing 1954–55 legislative his-
tory and private relief bill passed in connection with the decision rejecting liability in the Texas
City disaster case, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
12. See Thompson v. Deal, 92 F.2d 478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Stephens, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he maxim ‘equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’ is not safely to be followed
in respect of a wrong asserted to have been imposed by the Government.”).
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The FTCA was enacted as one part of a broader legislative “house-
keeping” measure—the Legislative Reorganization Act of 194613—
whereby Congress removed from itself (or at least greatly reduced) certain
time-consuming administrative responsibilities. As a result of the dramatic
change in the size and scope of government in connection with the Great
Depression, World War II, and Roosevelt-era reforms generally, it had be-
come necessary to modernize the national legislature to cope with its vastly
increased workload. One long-standing Congressional duty alleviated by
the Reorganization Act was the consideration of “private bills,” which until
that point had been essentially the only way for injured citizens to recover
from the United States for tortious conduct by government employees act-
ing within the scope of employment.14 A private bill deals with one or more
named individuals or entities, often providing benefits in response to a spe-
cific request in an area such as immigration or private claims. The Supreme
Court has referred to Congress’s pre-FTCA handling of private bills as a
“notoriously clumsy” process.15
The number of private bills has greatly declined over the past half-
century, at least partly as a result of the FTCA’s passage.16 Despite this
decline, however, private bills today are far from dead.17 In Bailor v. Salva-
tion Army and United States,18 for example, the Seventh Circuit in 1995
upheld the denial of relief under existing law to a plaintiff who was raped
by an escapee from a halfway house and alleged, among other claims, that
the United States Bureau of Prisons had negligently placed the escapee at
the halfway house. In denying the FTCA claim, the court also observed that
“private legislation . . . would not, in appropriate cases, be an inappropriate
response” to certain unfair situations.19 More recently, in 2005, Congress
13. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
14. See The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 535 (1947) (noting that passage of
the FTCA was in part motivated by the fact that Congress was “burdened by thousands of claim
bills at every session”); Walter Gellhorn & Louis Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims
Against the United States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 (1955) (noting the “seeming success of the
Federal Tort Claims Act in reducing the volume of tort claims submitted to Congress for settle-
ment,” though also observing that the “legislative docket remains jammed”).
15. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24–25 (1953).
16. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-727-C, CONGRESSIONAL STATIS-
TICS: BILLS INTRODUCED AND LAWS ENACTED, 1947–2003, at CRS-2 to -3 (2004) (noting the
decline in private bills; listing enactment of 1103 such bills by the 81st Congress in 1949–50, 492
by the 86th in 1959–60, 246 by the 91st in 1969–70, 123 by the 96th in 1979–80, 16 by the 101st
in 1989–90, and 24 by the 106th in 1999–2000); Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws,
99 LAW LIBR. J. 87, 91–94 (2007) (noting same trend and offering explanations).
17. See, e.g., Legislation, Laws, and Acts, U.S. SENATE, www.senate.gov/legislative/com-
mon/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (“A private bill provides benefits to
specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through
private legislation when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted.”).
18. 51 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 1995).
19. Id. at 686; see also H.R. 1328, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 201, 109th Cong. (2005)
(introducing private bill and resolution to address Bailor situation subsequent to Seventh Circuit
ruling).
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passed a quasi-private law enabling the parents of Terry Schiavo to bring
suit in Florida federal court challenging the withholding of food, water, and
medical attention from their daughter.20 These examples illustrate that,
while by no means easy or commonplace, it remains possible to obtain pri-
vate legislative relief today—a possibility that should not be forgotten in
discussions of the FTCA and its scope.
B. Exceptions to FTCA Liability
As noted, there are several sources of exceptions from the FTCA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United States. This
section of the article begins by looking at the exceptions expressly listed in
28 U.S.C. § 2680. Consideration is then given to other exceptions built into
the definitions and textual scope of the FTCA, as well as some of the excep-
tions that arise not directly from the FTCA but from other federal laws that
preclude FTCA recovery by creating their own exclusive remedies.
1. Exceptions Listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680
The FTCA contains a number of “carefully worded exceptions”21 set
forth in a list found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680. One of the more fascinating—and
controversial22—of these is the so-called “intentional tort exception.” At 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h), the FTCA expressly excludes from its scope any claim
“arising out of” eleven categories of torts: assault or battery; false imprison-
ment or false arrest; malicious prosecution or abuse of process; libel or
slander; misrepresentation or deceit; and interference with contract rights.23
Notably, at least four intentional torts are not included in this list: trespass,
conversion, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Accordingly, Congress made clear its intent to exclude only a subset
of intentional torts from the scope of the FTCA as the statute (a) does not
contain the term “intentional torts”; (b) fails to include all intentional torts
in the list of excluded causes of action at § 2680(h); and (c) excludes some
torts that courts have held need not always be intentional.24 For these rea-
sons, although the term has persisted (and this article will use it), it is
20. See Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (enacting a law “For the relief
of the parents of Theresa [“Terry”] Marie Schiavo”).
21. The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 542.
22. See, e.g., id. at 547 (noting that this “sweeping exception imposes a hardship upon claim-
ants and leaves open one fruitful source of private claim bills,” and expressing the view that
Congress’s stated reasons for including the exception seem “insufficient”); Developments in the
Law: Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 891–92 (1957)
(suggesting that the exception of certain intentional torts from FTCA liability “should be reas-
sessed by Congress”).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
24. Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299, 1305 (Miss. 1989) (“Under Mississippi defamation
law, libel is not necessarily an intentional tort.”); Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 583
n.13 (Alaska 1973) (noting that “slander is not necessarily an intentional tort”).
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widely acknowledged that the label “intentional tort exception” is some-
thing of a misnomer.25
Other exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 include the prohibition against
using the FTCA to challenge the validity of a statute or regulation and the
discretionary-function exception, both found in § 2680(a).26 The FTCA also
prohibits claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmis-
sion of letters or postal matter”;27 claims “arising in respect of the assess-
ment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any
goods, merchandise, or other property” by any customs or other law en-
forcement officer;28 claims alleging damages caused by a quarantine;29
claims for “damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by
the regulation of the monetary system”;30 and claims “arising out of the
combatant activities of the military . . . during time of war.”31 In 1950, this
latter exception was significantly expanded when the Supreme Court de-
cided Feres v. United States,32 creating the Feres doctrine, which bars all
FTCA claims by military personnel arising out of activity incident to mili-
tary service—regardless of whether the activity occurred during a time of
war. Section 2680 also bars claims arising from the activities of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority;33 the Panama Canal Company;34 or any federal land
bank, federal intermediate credit bank, or bank for cooperatives.35
25. See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that courts
“sometimes have referred loosely to section 2680(h) as an ‘intentional torts’ exception” even
though “the provision only preserves the federal government’s immunity with respect to claims
arising out of certain enumerated torts” (citations omitted)).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (prohibiting claims “based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty” and claims “based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation”).
27. Id. § 2680(b); see The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 546 & n.81 (stating that
this exception is “based on the number of cases which might arise were it not included,” as well as
“the ease with which postal matter may be insured”).
28. Id. § 2680(c). This provision contains an exception to the exception for claims based on
“injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property” while in government possession under
specified circumstances. See id.; see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 220 (2008)
(reading “any other law enforcement officer” expansively to include “law enforcement officers of
whatever kind”).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(f); see The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 546 (“No satis-
factory explanation for the quarantine provision has been given,” although it was “once described
as ‘dangerous’” (quoting FTCA legislative history)).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i); see The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 546 & n.80
(noting that Congress “presumably felt that the liability would be too immense and the damages
too widespread to justify any allowance of claims” pertaining to the monetary system, although
the “explanations given for these provisions are often ambiguous or inconclusive”).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
32. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(l).
34. Id. § 2680(m).
35. Id. § 2680(n).
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2. Exceptions Based on Statutory Definitions and Scope
Additional exceptions are inherent in the structure and scope of the
waiver of sovereign immunity, including the statute’s definitional portions.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, for example, that the FTCA’s juris-
dictional grant36 does not extend to strict-liability torts, notwithstanding the
fact that the statute nowhere expressly excludes or otherwise mentions
strict-liability concepts.37 Another provision in the jurisdictional grant ex-
pressly precludes convicted prisoners from suing the United States “for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior show-
ing of physical injury.”38
Courts have likewise found FTCA claims to be barred on the ground
that the alleged tortfeasor was not an “employee of the Government.” For
example, the Eighth Circuit in 1977 held that the FTCA cannot apply to a
private attorney appointed by the court to represent a defendant in a federal
criminal prosecution39 and later found no liability for the negligence of a
private person who was acting as a federally designated “Airworthiness
Representative.”40
The “contractor exception” arises from the FTCA’s definitions of “em-
ployee” and “agency.”41 Simply put, the FTCA imposes damages liability
only for torts committed by “officers or employees of any federal agency”
and expressly defines “federal agency” to “not include any contractor with
the United States.”42 Thus, courts have found that wherever the term “fed-
eral agency” appears in the FTCA, Congress meant it to refer solely to
official components of the Federal Government.43
3. Federal Exclusivity Statutes
Yet another category of exceptions from FTCA liability involves fed-
eral exclusivity statutes. For example, the language of the FTCA itself ex-
cludes claims cognizable under the Suits in Admiralty Act or Public Vessels
Act44 and claims arising from administration of the Trading with the Enemy
Act.45 Relatedly, numerous other federal statutes either prohibit or provide
their own single mechanism for potential recovery against the government
and thus indirectly prevent claims that would otherwise be cognizable under
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
37. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
44–45 (1953).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003).
39. Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 251 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977).
40. Charlima, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1078, 1081–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814–15 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 661
F.3d 87, 92, 105 (1st Cir. 2011).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (2006) (referencing 46 U.S.C. § 745 ch. 309, 311).
45. See id. § 2680(e) (referencing 50 U.S.C. Appendix, sections 1–31).
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the FTCA. A small sampling of such statutes includes the Social Security
and Medicare Acts, which provide the exclusive remedies for wrongs per-
taining to the administration of these programs;46 the Federal Employees’
Compensation Act (FECA), which bars federal employees from suing the
United States for on-the-job injuries;47 the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, providing the exclusive remedy for expenses incurred in cleaning up
oil spills;48 and the Flood Act, which immunizes the government from any
liability arising from flood control.49
Beyond the many statutes that expressly preclude FTCA liability, cer-
tain comprehensive remedial schemes have been found to embody implied
restrictions preempting FTCA liability. One such scheme is the remedies
already available to federal employees through the civil service system,
which the Eighth Circuit in 1984 held preempted claims of negligent termi-
nation or failure to promote.50
4. The Foreign Country Exception
The FTCA’s “foreign country” exception bars “[a]ny claim arising in a
foreign country.”51 This provision was enacted primarily to protect against
the specter of Americans being subjected to foreign law.52 While this may
seem straightforward, the statute contains no definition of “foreign coun-
try,” and over the years, the provision has given rise to such questions as
whether FTCA claims may arise from conduct occurring at American em-
bassies,53 wartime acquisitions,54 military bases,55 and foreign airspace.56
In Smith v. United States,57 the Supreme Court directly addressed
whether an FTCA claim can arise from a tort occurring on the sovereignless
continent of Antarctica—where there is no foreign law. Smith was a wrong-
ful death case in which the plaintiff alleged that the government negligently
failed to warn her late husband of the dangerous conditions present in Ant-
arctica. The eight-Justice majority opinion considered multiple factors—in-
cluding the dictionary definition of “country” as “a region or tract of
land”;58 the difficulties of choice of law and venue that would arise if
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006).
47. See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) 200.
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (2006).
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2006).
50. See Premachandra v. United States, 739 F.2d 392, 394 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
52. See The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 548 & n.95 (citing FTCA legislative
history).
53. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1964).
54. See Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
55. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949).
56. See Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 151, 152 (E.D. N.Y. 1959).
57. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
58. Id. at 201.
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FTCA claims could arise in “no-man’s land”;59 and the general presump-
tions against both waivers of sovereign immunity and the extraterritorial
reach of Congressional statutes—and concluded that the “foreign country”
exception does indeed apply to Antarctica, and thus, the United States gen-
erally may not be sued in tort for claims arising on that continent.60
While the Smith decision left open the question of whether the FTCA
applies to tort claims arising in outer space, Justice Stevens in dissent
warned that the ruling would lead inevitably to denial of such claims.61
Most commentators seem to agree,62 and lower court rulings to date seem to
bear out Justice Stevens’s prediction.63
The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain64 unanimously re-
jected the “headquarters doctrine,” whereby several courts of appeals had
found the federal government liable for torts occurring in foreign countries
if the wrongdoing was planned or directed by government employees
within the United States. The Court found that this theory opened the door
too far to the very sort of claims from which Congress intended to protect
the federal government.65 Accordingly, the Court held that the foreign
country exception applies to “all claims based on any injury suffered in a
foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred.”66
C. Rationale Behind the “Intentional Tort” Exception
Turning specifically to the “intentional tort” exception, many have
asked why Congress would choose to allow recovery based on negligence
while barring recovery for most intentional torts—which presumably re-
present more egregious conduct by government employees and can cer-
tainly lead to similar harms.67 Understanding Congress’s rationale here
presents particular challenges because the FTCA’s 28-year legislative his-
59. Id. at 202–03.
60. See id. at 204–05.
61. See id. at 205–06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing that denial of claims in the “sover-
eignless region” of Antarctica parallels the denial of claims arising in outer space).
62. See, e.g., Marcy Darsey, “To the Stars, Despite Adversity”: Liability for the Columbia
Space Shuttle Tragedy, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 482 (2005) (noting that “the fact that the Columbia
may have disintegrated while in the sovereignless region of outer space appears to bar an FTCA
suit against the government for NASA’s negligence.”); Lauren S.B. Bornemann, This is Ground
Control to Major Tom . . . Your Wife Would Like to Sue but There’s Nothing We Can Do . . . The
Unlikelihood that the FTCA Waives Sovereign Immunity for Torts Committed by United States
Employees in Outer Space: A Call for Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR LAW & COMMERCE 517,
535 (1998) (observing that the Smith decision “appears to exclude outer space from consideration
for FTCA coverage”).
63. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 231 (1993).
64. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
65. Id. at 710.
66. Id. at 712.
67. See Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and its Officials,
supra note 22; see also Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 403 (1988) (observing that it
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tory contains scant commentary on the intentional-tort exception. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that the exception first appeared in the bill in 1931,68 and
several interrelated reasons for the exception were offered during a Senate
Judiciary subcommittee hearing in March of 1940.
A 1939 Department of Justice memorandum included in the committee
report stated that, “for the time being at least, it may be dangerous for the
Government to subject itself to suit” from these torts, “until in any event
considerable experience has been had under the proposed legislation.”69
Elaborating on this concept, the committee report observed that claims aris-
ing out of assault, battery, and the like constitute
a type of torts which would be difficult to make a defense against,
and which are easily exaggerated. For that reason it seemed to
those who framed this bill that it would be safe to exclude those
types of torts, and those should be settled on the basis of private
acts.70
Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee later in 1940, Special Assis-
tant to the Attorney General Mr. Holtzoff further explained that
[t]he theory of these exemptions is that, since this bill is a radical
innovation, perhaps we had better take it step by step and exempt
certain torts and certain actions which might give rise to tort
claims that would be difficult to defend, or in respect to which it
would be unjust to make the Government liable.71
A few themes emerge from these passages. First, there was a sentiment
that exposing the public fisc to potential liability for assault, battery, and
other listed torts would be “dangerous,” based on the notion that these torts
are both easy for plaintiffs to exaggerate and difficult to defend against.
Indeed, this reasoning was expressed by stating that it would be “unjust” to
make the government liable for these torts.
Second, excluding these intentional torts from the FTCA was viewed
as “safe”—at least “for the time being” or until “considerable experience”
could be had under the FTCA generally without these torts being included.
Thus, in passing the “intentional tort” exception, Congress took a “wait and
see” or “step by step” approach to the scope of liability under the FTCA.
“would be odd to assume that Congress intended” to create liability for a breach of duty when a
person causing harm “was merely negligent but not when he or she was malicious”).
68. S. 211, 72d Cong. § 206 (1931); see also General Tort Bill: Hearing on H.R. 5065
Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong. 4 (1932).
69. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 13 (3d Sess. 1940) (Memorandum by the Dept. of Justice for
the Att’y Gen. (June 7, 1939)).
70. Id. at 39 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, special assistant to the Att’y. Gen. of the
United States).
71. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 22 (3d Sess. 1940) (quoted in Sheridan v. United
States, 487 U.S. at 410 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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The final theme that emerges is the assumption that claims arising
under any of the excluded torts could and would be “settled on the basis of
private acts.” This is a reminder of what Congress intended to do in 1946 by
enacting the FTCA—transfer decision-making authority concerning the
payment of certain “[d]ebts of the United States”72 from the legislature to
the federal courts.73 By indicating an ongoing willingness to entertain pri-
vate bills for excepted torts, Congress made clear that this transfer was not
meant to be complete.
D. The “Law Enforcement Proviso”: An Exception to (Some of) the
Exceptions
To some extent the proposed “step by step” approach came to fruition,
insofar as Congress has expanded the scope of the waiver of sovereign im-
munity since the FTCA’s original passage. Today, for example, the “inten-
tional tort” exception contains a “law enforcement proviso” that constitutes
an “exception to the exceptions”—at least as to some of the otherwise ex-
cepted torts. In response to a national outcry over certain widely publicized
law enforcement excesses in the early 1970s, Congress amended § 2680(h)
in 1974 to expand the scope of FTCA liability by effectively contracting the
scope of the intentional tort exception—although only as to torts committed
by a defined subcategory of government employees. As a result of the law
enforcement proviso, the FTCA now permits suits based on tortious con-
duct by federal law enforcement officers for six of the eleven otherwise-
excluded torts: assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution.74
According to this proviso, tort claims in these categories may be
brought based on “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government,” defined as “any officer of the
United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evi-
dence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”75 The provision is
thus doubly limited insofar as claims pursuant to only a limited subset of
otherwise-excluded intentional torts may be brought based only on conduct
by a limited subset of federal officials. Nonetheless, claims arising under
this “exception to the exception,” sometimes referred to as “proviso torts,”
have greatly shifted the FTCA litigation landscape.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
73. See The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 14, at 554 (articulating view that, in decid-
ing FTCA claims, courts are acting as an “arm of the legislative department of the Government”).
74. Id. Another example of the “step by step approach” is reflected in the Emergency Health
Personnel Act of 1970, which made the FTCA’s assault and battery exception inapplicable to
claims arising out of negligence of a commissioned officer of the Public Health Service in the
performance of medical functions. See Pub. L. No. 91-623, § 4, 84 Stat. 1868, 1870–71 (1970).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
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E. Some Court Decisions Applying the Exceptions
Considerable judicial energy has been devoted to discerning the
boundary between excepted and non-excepted torts—as well as to the ques-
tion of how to proceed when interrelated claims of both sorts are present in
a single case. In general, courts begin the inquiry by looking to the “tradi-
tional legal definition” of alleged torts “as [they] would have been under-
stood by Congress when the Tort Claims Act was enacted.”76 In
characterizing tort claim allegations, the Supreme Court has cautioned
against “assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort definitions
when it enacted the Tort Claims Act in 1946”77 and observed that “[t]here is
nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw
distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being
held in the mind for adequate formulation.”78 A brief look at some of the
cases addressing proviso torts and the misrepresentation exception follows.
1. Proviso Torts
Courts have frequently faced the question whether, when an assault
and battery (or any other excluded intentional tort) has occurred in a non-
proviso context, plaintiffs may nonetheless raise an FTCA claim based on
an indirect theory of liability. Such claims against the government have
involved negligent hiring or supervision of the tortfeasor, or some other
“independent” negligence-based tort that is not listed as barred by 2680(h),
even though factually related to the underlying intentional tort that is listed
as barred.
In Sheridan v. United States,79 the Supreme Court held that such
claims may be viable in some circumstances. The facts there involved an
intentional tort committed outside the scope of a federal employee’s official
duty (specifically, rifle shots fired down a public street by an intoxicated,
off-duty serviceman), and the Court left open the question of whether negli-
gent hiring, training, or supervision claims can ever arise under the FTCA
“for a foreseeable assault or battery by a Government employee.”80
76. Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 296 (1983); see also Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d
1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1990).
77. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707 (1961).
78. Id. at 708 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955)).
79. 487 U.S. 392 (1988).
80. Id. at 403 n.8. Both the district court and the court of appeals in Sheridan had “assumed”
that the complaint stated a claim of some sort under Maryland law based on negligence by govern-
ment employees at a Naval base who allowed the allegedly foreseeable shooting to occur. Id. at
401–02. The Supreme Court, not wanting to second-guess this assumption, remanded the case for
further consideration of liability. Given the nature of the plaintiff’s legal theory, the Sheridan
Court observed that the shooter’s employment status had “nothing to do with the basis for impos-
ing liability on the Government.” Id. at 402–03 & nn. 6–8.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-MAY-12 11:23
2011] EXCEPTIONS TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 387
The majority of post-Sheridan lower courts answer this question in the
negative. For example, in Billingsley v. United States,81 the plaintiff alleged
negligent failure to supervise by the United States Job Corps of an enrollee
who “struck [plaintiff] over the head with a glass bottle and kicked him
repeatedly.”82 In remanding for factual findings, the Eighth Circuit joined
every other circuit but the Ninth83 to have addressed the issue in holding
that, if the tortfeasor was found to have been acting within the scope of
employment, no FTCA claim would lie based on negligent supervision of
the tortfeasor by another government actor.84 Quoting the 1940 legislative
history, the Eighth Circuit concluded that holding the government vicari-
ously liable based solely on the employment relationship “would frustrate
the purpose” of the intentional-tort exception, “which is to bar suits result-
ing from ‘deliberate attacks by Government employees.’”85
2. Misrepresentation
In addition to the proviso torts, questions have repeatedly been raised
about which claims properly fall within the misrepresentation exception.
Some courts have referred to this as the “fraud and misrepresentation” ex-
ception86 and have also found that it encompasses negligent as well as in-
tentional misrepresentation.87 Two key Supreme Court decisions relevant to
various FTCA exceptions—United States v. Neustadt88 and Block v.
Neal89—arose in the misrepresentation context.  Among other important
points, these decisions together stand for the proposition that plaintiffs can-
not circumvent the exceptions by artful pleading. In Neustadt, the Court
stated that it is important to look beyond the language of plaintiffs’ claims
“to ascertain the real cause of the complaint.”90 Thus, at least when misrep-
resentation is at issue, a claim will be barred if the essence of the complaint
involves the government’s failure to use due care in obtaining or communi-
cating information, regardless of how a plaintiff may try to characterize his
or her claim.91
81. 251 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curium).
82. Id. at 697.
83. See Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the assault
and battery exception does not preclude liability for negligent supervision of an employee); Ben-
nett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986).
84. See Billingsley, 251 F.3d at 698.
85. Id. (quoting Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 39 (1940)).
86. See, e.g., McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1993).
87. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 704 (1961).
88. Id.
89. 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
90. Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 703 (quoting Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir.
1959)).
91. See id. at 706; Neal, 460 U.S. at 297.
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As the Court made clear in Neal, however, the bar against misrepre-
sentation claims (like the other exceptions) does not preclude other inde-
pendent claims merely because they may involve some common questions
of law or fact.92 The United States, for example, cannot shield itself from
liability simply by adding a misrepresentation to an otherwise actionable
tort.93 The recent case of Najbar v. United States94 illustrates some of these
points. Although the plaintiff’s complaint alleged only claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligence per se, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the district court dismissed them all based
on the conclusion that they actually sounded in misrepresentation.95 On the
undisputed facts of the case, a letter intended for a soldier serving in Iraq
was erroneously returned to the plaintiff mother bearing a postal stamp
marked “deceased.”96 The mother confirmed later that day that her son was
in fact alive and well but alleged that she was harmed by the incident and
entitled to damages as a result.97
The question for District Judge Patrick Schiltz98 was whether the
plaintiff’s claim based on this unfortunate mistake was actionable under the
FTCA or barred by one or more of the intentional-tort exclusions. The court
held that, regardless of how the claims may be styled, the but-for cause of
any injury to the plaintiff—telling the mother her son was dead when he
was not—was the communication of information, which is central to the
tort of misrepresentation.99 While acknowledging that most misrepresenta-
tion claims arise in the commercial context, the court concluded that noth-
ing in § 2680(h) suggests any limitation to that subset of claims for
misrepresentation.100
The district court in Najbar also considered whether the “postal mat-
ters” exception of § 2680(b) could provide an additional basis for dismissal.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan v. Postal Service,101
which reads that FTCA exception narrowly, the court rejected the govern-
ment’s argument, concluding that the complaint did not allege that the letter
was lost, miscarried, or negligently transmitted.102
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds.103 The court of
appeals did not reach the applicability of the misrepresentation exception
92. See, e.g., Neal, 460 U.S. at 298.
93. See id.
94. No. 10-3015, 649 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (reh’g and reh’g en banc denied
Nov. 8, 2011 (Bye, J., dissenting)), aff’g 723 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Minn. 2010).
95. Najbar, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1137–38.
96. Id. at 1133.
97. Id.
98. Former Associate Dean and professor at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.
99. Najbar, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37.
100. Id. at 1137.
101. 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
102. Najbar, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
103. See Najbar, 649 F.3d at 869.
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because it concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred under the postal
matters exception.104 Although the letter was not lost and the court agreed
with the district court that the envelope also was not “damaged” by virtue of
having been erroneously stamped,105 the Eighth Circuit concluded that re-
turning it to the soldier’s mother constituted a “miscarriage” of mail.106 As
the court put it, the plaintiff’s alleged harm—while of an “uncommon” and
“idiosyncratic” variety—plainly resulted from the fact of the letter being
mistakenly returned to her with an injurious explanation as to the reason.107
II. CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
(“IIED”) UNDER THE FTCA
Given the numerous exceptions discussed above, and Congress’s ratio-
nale for enacting the so-called “intentional tort” exception, it may seem
surprising that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (other-
wise known as “IIED” or “outrage”) is actionable under the FTCA. The
remainder of this article will briefly review the development and general
contours of the IIED cause of action and then consider ways in which courts
have approached various species of IIED claims brought under FTCA
auspices.
A. The Development of IIED as a Separate Cause of Action
Although certainly not unheard of, IIED was by no means uniformly
or even widely recognized at the time the FTCA was originally enacted in
1946.108 The Restatement of Torts first acknowledged the possibility that a
plaintiff might recover in tort despite a lack of demonstrable physical injury
in 1948, two years after the FTCA’s passage, and (while some had done so
previously) courts in disparate jurisdictions adopted variations of this theory
at different times over the subsequent decades.109
To succeed on a claim of IIED a plaintiff generally must show the
following elements: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or with reckless
disregard of the consequences; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme or
outrageous; (3) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) the
defendant’s conduct caused that distress.110 In general, IIED is a “very nar-
104. Id. at 872–73.
105. Id. at 871–72.
106. Id. at 872.
107. Id. at 872–73.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1950) (noting that
section 46 of the Restatement of Torts was not “revamped” to include IIED under the “Assault
and Battery” chapter until 1948, two years after the FTCA was enacted).
109. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 436–38 (Me. 1982)
(discussing various tests for recovery and holding that only serious mental injury that was foresee-
able as a result of witnessing another’s harm from a tortfeasor’s negligent act is compensable);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 174–75 (Mass. 1982).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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row” tort.111 It has been referred to as a “gap-filler” tort, insofar as it should
never replace or duplicate another tort already available to the claimant.112
By definition, therefore, cases arising under the rubric of IIED—or its close
cousin, negligent infliction of emotional distress—often involve theories
not otherwise legally cognizable, such as claims of mind-control113 or the
“fear of cancer” (a.k.a. “cancerphobia”).114 IIED has also sometimes served
as the vehicle of choice for proponents of novel liability theories, such as a
cause of action for slavery reparations.115
B. IIED and the FTCA’s “Intentional Torts” Exception: A History
As previously noted, today a consensus exists that—so long as they do
not simply amount to artful attempts to “plead around” excluded torts—
IIED claims are not barred by the FTCA.116 But it was not always so. In
1950, four years after the FTCA was enacted and two years after IIED first
appeared in the Restatement, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA categori-
cally excluded claims for IIED in United States v. Hambleton.117 Hamble-
ton involved an IIED claim based on an excessive interrogation that caused
the plaintiff to become psychotic, requiring the patient to undergo “shock
treatments.”118 The court observed that mental suffering was the only form
of injury alleged and noted that the existence of such a cause of action
reflected a “comparatively recent growth in the law.”119 The court framed
111. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing com-
ment in PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 61 (5th ed. 1984), that IIED requirements
“are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy”).
112. See, e.g., Moser v. Roberts, 185 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (“IIED is first and
foremost a ‘gap-filler’ tort which was created for the ‘limited purpose of allowing recovery in
those rare instances where a defendant inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.’” (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004))).
113. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (alleging IIED based on
unwitting involvement in CIA drug-testing program); Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
171, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
114. See, e.g., In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Me. 1986); Ayers v. Township
of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184, 188–89 (N.J. 1983); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 54, at 363 n. 34 (5th ed. 1984) (providing a list of cases and similar “fears”); see also
Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978) (fear of tuberculosis); see also generally
Keith J. Klein, Fear of Cancer – A Legitimate Claim in Tort Cases?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 193 (1990);
Robert L. Willmore, In Fear of Cancerphobia, 3 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 559 (Sept. 28, 1988).
115. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting IIED slavery-
reparations claim brought under the FTCA based on two-year statute of limitations and fact that
injuries arose before January 1, 1945); Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., The Alchemy and Legacy of
the United States of America’s Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: A Property Law and Equita-
ble Remedy Analysis of African American Reparations, 43 HOWARD L.J. 171, 172, 205 (2000)
(asserting a “demand for reparations to all African American families,” and suggesting that IIED
under the FTCA is a “dignitary tort that could be utilized as the basis” for such a claim).
116. See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2009).
117. 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950).
118. Id. at 565.
119. Id. at 566.
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the legal question as “whether this new development is in substance, and in
reality, an extension of the law of assault,” and extensively quoted from the
“Assault and Battery” chapter of the Restatement of Torts, which is where
the IIED provision was first inserted in the 1948 revision.120 Characterizing
IIED as “but a new type of assault,” the court concluded that Congress
“must have intended” the FTCA’s “assault” exclusion to encompass IIED
cases.121 “The absurdity of any other view,” the court stated, “would be
manifest, if we were to hold that if when he used his frightening words
[plaintiff’s interrogator] had pointed a pistol at the plaintiff, then the United
States would not be liable, but that if he had displayed no pistol, the United
States could be held.”122
Forty years later, in Sheehan v. United States,123 the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized that Hambleton was “no longer controlling.”124 The plaintiff in
Sheehan alleged that her military supervisor caused humiliation and emo-
tional distress by sexually harassing and slandering her. The district court—
relying on Hambleton—concluded that the IIED claim fell within the
FTCA’s intentional-tort exclusion because it actually sounded in assault.125
In reversing, the court of appeals held that Hambleton’s view of IIED as
nothing more than a species of assault had been overtaken by events and
specifically discussed the intervening Supreme Court decisions in Rayonier
Inc. v. United States,126 United States v. Neustadt,127 and Block v. Neal,128
all of which the court viewed as undermining Hambleton’s conclusion that
IIED is necessarily barred by the FTCA’s exclusion of assault claims.129
The Ninth Circuit in Sheehan stated that, in determining that Congress
must have meant for the FTCA’s exclusions to encompass IIED, Hambleton
ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s subsequent caution against “read[ing] ex-
emptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress.”130 The court
noted the requirement, based on Neustadt and Neal, to look beyond a plain-
tiff’s “characterization of the cause of action” to the “conduct upon which
plaintiff’s claim is based.”131 If that conduct “constitutes an assault as that
tort is traditionally defined,” the IIED claim based on it will be “barred
even though the conduct may also constitute a tort other than assault.”132
120. Id. at 566–67.
121. Id. at 567.
122. Id.
123. 896 F.2d 1168 (1990).
124. Id. at 1172.
125. See id. (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)).
126. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
127. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
128. 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
129. See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1170–71 (1990); see also the discussion of
Neustadt and Neal at pp. 387–88, supra.
130. Id. at 1170 (quoting Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 320).
131. Id. at 1171.
132. Id.
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On the other hand, if any “aspect of the conduct upon which plaintiff relies
did not constitute an assault, suit is not barred even though another aspect
of that conduct may have been assaultive.”133
Today courts considering IIED claims brought under the FTCA widely
recognize and apply this rule, which is taken directly from the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Neal.134 The Supreme Court in Neal faced a situation in
which the plaintiff had both a barred misrepresentation claim and a non-
barred claim based in part on common factual and legal issues. According
to the Court in Neal,
the partial overlap between these two tort actions does not support
the conclusion that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims Act,
the other must be as well. Neither the language nor history of the
Act suggests that when one aspect of the Government’s conduct
is not actionable under the “misrepresentation” exception, a
claimant is barred from pursuing a distinct claim arising out of
other aspects of the Government’s conduct.135
Ultimately in Sheehan, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court
because it could not determine whether any of the plaintiff’s allegations
would “permit proof of conduct that is not within the definition of any of
the excluded torts”—and, consequently, whether those allegations would
“support Sheehan’s claim she suffered injury from the [IIED] independently
of injury suffered from excluded conduct.”136
Sheehan relied in part for its analysis on the 1982 Eighth Circuit deci-
sion in Gross v. United States.137 Gross is one of many examples of the
challenges courts face when attempting to “look beyond” a plaintiff’s alle-
gations to the underlying acts complained of in order to determine the appli-
cability of an FTCA exception.138 The plaintiff in Gross complained of
fraud and falsification by government officials, including wrongfully deny-
ing him participation in an agricultural subsidy program and causing him
financial harm and attendant emotional distress.139
Criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s Hambleton decision, and considering
the “wrongs” alleged in the complaint, the majority in Gross concluded that
the plaintiff’s claim was not barred by § 2680(h).140 The dissent, however,
concluded that the claim should be excluded because the “wrongful acts
underlying the action” all amounted to torts falling within § 2680(h)—spe-
cifically, interference with contract, misrepresentation, libel, slander, mali-
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Limone, 579 F.3d at 92–93 (relying on Neal’s analysis in IIED context).
135. Neal, 460 U.S. at 298 (quoted by Sheehan, 896 F.2d at 1170–71).
136. Sheehan, 896 F.2d at 1173.
137. 676 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1982).
138. See id.; Neal, 460 U.S. at 296 (focusing on the “gravamen of the action against the
Government”).
139. 676 F.2d at 297.
140. Id. at 304.
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cious prosecution, and abuse of process.141 According to the dissenting
opinion, the majority “err[ed] in allowing the drafting of Gross’s complaint
to determine whether his action falls within the exceptions.”142 Addition-
ally, the dissent concluded, as defined by the relevant “law of the place,”
the IIED tort would be “implicitly included in [§] 2680(h)” because “South
Dakota law requires Gross to show an invasion of rights closely analogous
to those invasions of rights listed in [§] 2680(h) . . . .”143
The issues dividing the majority and the dissent in Gross are inherently
perplexing. Particularly without seeing either the complaint or (as applica-
ble) any subsequent record evidence, it is often exceedingly difficult to un-
derstand the basis for characterizing FTCA tort claims in cases of this sort.
This may help explain why courts have seemingly reached widely divergent
conclusions on whether IIED claims fall within one of the many FTCA
exclusions. A brief survey of some of these cases follows.
C. FTCA Cases Finding IIED Claims Excluded
Courts have found IIED claims barred under the FTCA for a variety of
reasons. Some IIED claims are considered excluded because the conduct at
issue is determined to fall within the discretionary function exception.144
Other IIED claims have been characterized as essentially claims for assault
and thus barred by § 2680(h).145 Another basis on which IIED claims have
been excluded is the Feres doctrine, which—as previously mentioned—
generally bars any FTCA claim arising out of military service.146 Still other
courts have concluded that an action for IIED based on sexual harassment is
unavailable under the FTCA because Title VII or other statutory schemes
provide the exclusive remedy for such claims.147 One case concluded that
141. Id. at 305 (Floyd Gibson, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 574 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal
of IIED and other claims based on failure to evacuate prisoners in aftermath of hurricane); Sydnes
v. United States, 523 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment for govern-
ment on “outrageous conduct” and other claims arising from alleged wrongful termination and
retaliation); Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1549 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of sum-
mary judgment for plaintiff in IIED case based on mistaken identification by military of remains
of soldier shot down over Laos during Vietnam conflict).
145. See, e.g., Vallo v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (D. N.M. 2003) (summary
judgment for government where assault and battery claim of former inmate who was allegedly
sexually assaulted “encompasses the claim of the proposed IIED, and the allegations that support
those claims cannot be separated”); Koch v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D. D.C. 2002)
(granting motion to dismiss IIED claim based on alleged conduct that “could only be fairly char-
acterized as an assault”).
146. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778, 785 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
of IIED claim brought by ROTC cadet against commanding officer in connection with actions
taken in response to allegations of sexual assault).
147. See, e.g., Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 933 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 521
U.S. 801 (1998); Gergick v. Austin, 997 F.2d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 1993).
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an IIED claim brought by a defecting Iraqi, who alleged that the U.S. gov-
ernment failed to fulfill promises it made to him, was barred because it
actually sounded in contract and must be adjudicated under the Tucker
Act.148
In the face of a concurring opinion sharply differing with the major-
ity’s legal analysis, a 2009 Eleventh Circuit decision found that the
Supremacy Clause barred the FTCA claims at issue and, in particular, sum-
marily dismissed an IIED claim on the ground that IIED “is not one of the
torts enumerated within § 2680(h).”149 While this decision appears to be
anomalous, one commentator has observed that the “FTCA case law shows
a consistent refusal by courts to permit damage awards for . . . intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”150
The Supreme Court has not squarely faced the issue of whether an
IIED claim falls within one of the FTCA exceptions, but it has come close.
In Christopher v. Harbury,151 the Court unanimously held that a complaint
failed to state a Bivens claim against certain CIA and other federal govern-
ment officials for denial of access to the courts. The gravamen of the plain-
tiff’s underlying allegations in Harbury was that U.S. government officials
bore responsibility for the fact that her late husband—a Guatemalan rebel
leader—was detained, tortured, and summarily executed by Guatemalan
military officers, including officers trained, paid, and used as informants by
the CIA.152
In analyzing the constitutional denial-of-access claim (the only count
directly at issue before the Supreme Court in Harbury), Justice Souter’s
opinion for eight of the Justices153 reiterated the rule from prior decisions
that the right to access the courts is “ancillary to the underlying claim, with-
out which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of
court.”154 Accordingly, the denial-of-access plaintiff must identify a “non-
frivolous” underlying claim that the plaintiff was somehow prevented from
bringing and must also “identify a remedy that may be awarded as recom-
pense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.”155
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint “did not even
come close” to meeting this standard and—most relevant here—also went
on to address the attempt by plaintiff’s counsel to “supply the missing alle-
148. See Awad v. United States, No. 1: 93CV376-D-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8989, at
*11–12 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 2001), aff’d, 301 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
149. Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1345 & n.67 (11th Cir. 2009).
150. James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal In-
ternet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 522 (2003).
151. 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
152. Id. at 406–08.
153. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on the sole ground that he found no basis in
the Constitution for the sort of “right of access to courts” at issue. Id. at 422–23.
154. Id. at 415.
155. Id.
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gations” during oral argument before the court of appeals.156 The response
the attorney provided at that time was that the plaintiff “would have brought
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”157 In reversing the
district court’s dismissal of the denial-of-access claim, the D.C. Circuit had
“accepted this amendment as a sufficient statement of an underlying cause
of action.”158
The Supreme Court found this to be error and offered some telling
comments on the proposed underlying IIED claim. In an extended footnote,
the Court stated that the absence of any identifiable remedy made it “unnec-
essary to resolve any of the [denial-of-access] claim’s other difficulties in
satisfying the need for nonfrivolous and arguable underlying causes of ac-
tion.”159 Among several such difficulties, the Court noted that it would be
questionable whether any IIED claim “could be maintained under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act,” citing both the FTCA’s exclusion of “certain inten-
tional torts including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
misrepresentation,” and its exclusion of claims arising in a foreign coun-
try.160 This skeptical footnote, while not binding, seems to recognize that
other FTCA exceptions may often bar IIED claims even though IIED is not
listed as an excluded cause of action.
D. FTCA Cases Finding IIED Claims Not Excluded
Notwithstanding some of the hurdles to having an IIED claim recog-
nized under the FTCA, many courts have found such claims not to fall
within any of the statutory exclusions. Thus, a Mexican national was al-
lowed to bring an FTCA claim for IIED based on his allegedly wrongful
extraterritorial arrest by DEA agents.161 A recent case involving barred
claims of assault and molestation held that related “emotional distress suf-
fered as a result of the demand for sexual favors is an injury distinct from
the battery” and thus not subject to any FTCA exclusion.162 Another IIED
claim brought by the parents of a serviceman shot to death by a fellow
soldier, alleging that the Army mistreated them by suppressing information
about the incident, was held not to be barred by the Feres doctrine.163 Other
cases have allowed IIED claims based on forms of alleged harassment to
proceed under the FTCA.164 In one case, an FTCA damages award to a
156. Id. at 418.
157. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 419 (2002).
158. Id. at 420.
159. Id. at 420 n.19.
160. Id.
161. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 641 (9th Cir. 2003).
162. Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).
163. See Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 924 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing dismissal of
cause of action sounding in IIED).
164. See, e.g., Santiago–Ramirez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1993)
(allegedly wrongful theft accusation, interrogation, threatened FBI investigation, and termination);
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deceased prisoner’s estate under an IIED theory was affirmed based on a
prison guard’s delay in entering a cell to cut down the inmate once he was
discovered to have hanged himself.165 IIED claims involving allegations of
mind control experiments166 and other purported misconduct167 have also
been allowed to proceed under the FTCA.
In Limone v. United States,168 the First Circuit recently affirmed an
intentional-infliction FTCA judgment and damage award of more than 100
million dollars. The facts, as recounted by the court, were particularly egre-
gious.169 Four men were convicted in 1968 on state indictments for a
“gang-land slaying” that took place in 1965.170 In late 2000—more than 30
years later and after certain “scapegoats” had spent much of their lives
wrongfully incarcerated—the FBI “for the first time disclosed that all along
it had possessed reliable intelligence undercutting” the story of a key wit-
ness and that the FBI had “suppressed this intelligence” in order to “secure
the convictions.”171 Based on this belated revelation, the convictions were
vacated and the sole surviving defendant was released from prison.172 Vari-
ous plaintiffs (including the scapegoats’ family members) filed suit over the
incident, including multiple FTCA claims against the United States.173 Fol-
lowing a 22-day bench trial, the district court found for the plaintiffs on a
number of claims, including claims for IIED.174
On appeal, after concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove malicious
prosecution (because the FBI had never instituted criminal proceedings),175
the First Circuit considered the IIED claim. The court noted that the govern-
ment had waived any argument that the “seminal Massachusetts case” rec-
ognizing a cause of action for IIED had not yet been decided at the time of
the convictions at issue.176 The court stated that the question whether plain-
tiffs’ IIED claim actually “arises out of” malicious prosecution “necessi-
tates a fact-sensitive, case-specific inquiry” in which “substance trumps
form” and the court must “look past the nomenclature employed by the
Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 596–97 (5th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment); Jense v.
Runyon, 990 F. Supp. 1320, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (sexual harassment).
165. See Trentadue v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 867 (10th Cir. 2005).
166. See Ritchie v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
167. See Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2003); Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d
1445 (9th Cir. 1996); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994).
168. 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
169. See Bravo v. United States, 583 F.3d 1297, 1299 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (Carnes, J., concur-
ring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The facts in the Limone case grew out of one of the
darkest chapters in the history of the FBI.”).
170. Limone, 579 F.3d at 83.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 86.
174. Id. at 87.
175. See id. at 91.
176. Id. at 91 n.6 (discussing Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976)).
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plaintiff and focus on the actual nature of the plaintiff’s grievance.”177 The
court then listed two types of cases: those in which IIED was barred be-
cause the grievances were found to have rested on proof of excluded con-
duct178 and those in which IIED claims were not barred because there was
“merely a loose connection, a family resemblance, or even a partial overlap
between the conduct on which the asserted claim rests and that comprising
an excepted tort.”179 The court concluded that § 2680(h) did not exclude
IIED in this instance because the plaintiffs’ claim involved substantively
different proof of conduct “broader than that traditionally associated with
the tort of malicious prosecution”—specifically, proof of certain conduct
that post-dated the wrongful convictions and proof of extreme and outra-
geous FBI conduct.180 The First Circuit in Limone went on to affirm the
district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs proved the elements of IIED,181
and—despite some misgivings—upheld the very large damages award as
not outside the range of the district court’s discretion.182
CONCLUSION
The basic waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the FTCA is rid-
dled with exceptions, provisos, and exceptions to the exceptions. These pro-
visions often intersect, overlap, or even collide in complex ways in the
context of a single case, creating mind-bending challenges for litigants and
courts alike. While the rationale behind various exceptions has frequently
been questioned—often justifiably so—it must be borne in mind that Con-
gress never intended the FTCA to be a blanket waiver of sovereign immu-
nity as to any and all tort liability. The exceptions have been modified more
than once since the law’s original enactment, and further changes are no
doubt to be expected. Nevertheless, at this time the FTCA’s exceptions con-
stitute a core feature of the statutory scheme, and litigants are well-advised
to pay careful heed to their applicability in any case arising under the law.
177. Id. at 92–93.
178. See id. at 92 (citing Snow-Erlin v. United States, 470 F.3d 804, 808–09 (9th Cir. 2006);
Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1994); and Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988)).
179. Id. at 92–93 (citing Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840,
855 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding IIED claim not barred by misrepresentation exception because ele-
ments of misrepresentation, including reliance and pecuniary loss, were not present); Truman, 26
F.3d at 596 (IIED claim not barred by assault or battery exceptions because elements of latter torts
were not alleged); and Jimenez-Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1982) (negli-
gence claim not barred by misrepresentation exception because reliance not present)).
180. Limone, 579 F.3d at 93.
181. See id. at 100 (noting that the government did not challenge this finding by the district
court and observing that “[o]n this record, it is unarguable that the wrongful indictment, prosecu-
tion, conviction, and incarceration caused the victims severe emotional distress”).
182. See id. at 103–07.
